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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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25X1 [ ] (\*USSR - Berlin: In elaborating on his threat to sign a separate German peace treaty if the Federal Republic's Bundestag meets in West Berlin this fall, Khrushchev last week told Austrian officials privately that the USSR would follow the treaty by initiating a step-by-step harassment of the West in such a way that no one move would seem worth a war. He emphasized that "nobody can make me believe that the British, French, or even the Americans will go to war to keep Berlin for Adenauer." Khrushchev's public and private statements in Vienna appear to be part of a continuing bloc effort to probe the West's determination and unity in maintaining its position in Berlin. [ ]

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## II. ASIA-AFRICA

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Japan: The continuing deadlock over the selection of a successor to Prime Minister Kishi makes it almost certain the impasse will have to be resolved at the Liberal-Democratic party convention convening on 13 July. The three leading candidates still are Ikeda, Ono, and Ishii, but none as yet has enough support to win a majority on the first ballot. The outcome of the subsequent final ballot between the two top men is uncertain. Meanwhile, the Socialist parties are preparing for elections this fall, with the left-wing party concentrating on extending mass action tactics throughout the country. [redacted]

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Indonesia: The Indonesian Communist party, while continuing its praise of President Sukarno, has launched a vigorous campaign for a leftist cabinet. Since Sukarno is widely believed to favor a cabinet reshuffle which would include Communist representation, the party's campaign is probably designed to stiffen Sukarno's resolve and demonstrate mass support for his plans in the event of a showdown with the army, which opposes him on this issue. [redacted]  
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No  
\*Republic of the Congo: The "secession" of Katanga Province from the Congo on 11 July may be followed by similar moves in other provinces. In the absence of a reliable security force, it appears unlikely that Premier Lumumba can prevent the establishment of a separate Katanga state under the aegis of Moise Tshombé's Conakat party. The Conakat has been closely associated with Belgian financial interests in Katanga, and Brussels will probably be under pressure to recognize the Tshombé regime.

[redacted] Lumumba's appeal for UN "assistance" in the wake of the Congo disorders appears to be a move to forestall further intervention by Belgian forces. Lumumba has denounced Brussels' action in dispatching paratroops to protect its nationals in the Congo, even though the Belgian intervention had been approved by Foreign Minister Bomboko. Soviet and Chinese Communist


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propaganda accused the "imperialist powers in NATO" of carrying out an armed aggression against "the young Congo Republic. "

As of 0100 EDT on 12 July, the situation in Elisabethville and Leopoldville was tense but quiet. Other areas continue to be the scenes of anti-European disorders and looting, however, and further disturbances appear likely.



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USSR Presses for Early Ties With Somali Republic

The Soviet delegation which went to Somali's independence ceremony stayed beyond the scheduled 1-4 July celebration to cultivate Somali leaders and press for the immediate exchange of diplomatic missions.

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Mogadiscio's reaction to the Communist request will depend on which of two leading contenders becomes premier. Abdullahi Issa, the incumbent, is considered a practical politician without strong ideological objections to closer ties with the Communist nations. His opponent, Abdirascid Ali Scermerche, who is thought to have majority legislative support in his bid for premier, would probably oppose the Soviet request at this time.

The Soviet representatives also ostentatiously distributed expensive gifts to the President, prime minister, and other Somali ministers. One member of the delegation and an Izvestia correspondent remained in Mogadiscio, where they are reportedly looking into the possibility of a Soviet-backed irrigation program for development of the Upper Juba region.

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Selection of Kishi's Successor Rests With Party Convention

The continuing deadlock over selection of a successor to Prime Minister Kishi makes it almost certain the impasse will have to be resolved by the Liberal-Democratic party (LDP) convention which begins on 13 July. None of the three leading candidates for the party presidency--Ikeda, Ono, and Ishii--appears to have sufficient support to win the necessary majority on the first ballot, and a second vote to decide between the top two contenders will probably be necessary. Uncertainty over the outcome has been increased by announcements that two other candidates have entered the race--Kenzo Matsumura, earlier mentioned as a possible prime minister if anti-Kishi factions joined with Socialists, and Foreign Minister Aichiro Fujiyama, a relative newcomer to politics.

If the LDP convention chooses a new party president before 15 July, he could be elected prime minister before the current session of the Diet expires that day. Otherwise an extraordinary session would have to be called. Cabinet Secretary Shiina has said that the cabinet would resign on 13 July if the opposition parties agreed to a Diet vote on 14 July to designate the next prime minister. Officials of the Japanese Socialist party decided on 11 July to end the party's Diet boycott, which began on 19 May, to vote on Kishi's successor on condition that the LDP candidate pledge an early general election. LDP leaders would rather not hold elections during the summer when farmers are busiest and when university recesses free leftist teachers and Zengakuren members to campaign. Sentiment within the party appears to favor elections in mid-November or even as late as February after next year's budget has been worked out.

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Indonesian Communist Party Presses for Leftist Cabinet

The Indonesian Communist party, while continuing its lavish praise of President Sukarno, has launched a vigorous campaign for a leftist cabinet. Party Secretary General Aidit strongly criticized the government in an 8 July statement and called for a cabinet reshuffle. Two Communist dailies have published lengthy editorial assessments of the existing cabinet charging that it is unprogressive and inefficient and that it "must move further to the left."

The party has seized particularly on the issues of foreign policy and the nation's economy. It charges that the government has failed to oppose "imperialist" nations such as the United States and Australia and has even played into their hands; it urges that the cabinet work toward better relations with Peiping and that it take a more aggressive position on Indonesia's claim to West New Guinea. The Communists are also criticizing the cabinet's efforts at monetary reform, pointing out that the government has failed to carry out its promise to provide sufficient essential supplies throughout the nation, and that the economic and financial condition of the country is generally deteriorating.

Foreign Minister Subandrio, reacting quickly to the Communist attack, has stated that while there indeed are differences of opinion between him and the Communists, this divergence had been exaggerated by the party's distortion of facts. The government has made no response as yet to the Communist charges on the economy. The economic situation, characterized by continuing inflation, shortages, maldistribution and rising unemployment, is more difficult to defend.

The Communist campaign seems timed to take advantage of Sukarno's apparent displeasure with anti-Communist leadership over the latter's recent opposition to some of Sukarno's policies. Since Sukarno is widely believed to favor a cabinet reshuffle which would include Communist representation, the party's campaign is probably designed to stiffen Sukarno's resolve and demonstrate mass support for his plans in the event of a showdown with the army.

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